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Measuring Law School Clinics
Colleen F. Shanahan,* Jeffrey Selbin,** Alyx Mark,***
and Anna E. Carpenter****
Legal education reformers have long argued that law school clinics address two related
needs: first, clinics teach students to be lawyers; and second, clinics serve low-income clients.
In clinics, so the argument goes, law students working under the close supervision of faculty
members learn the requisite skills to be good practitioners and professionals. In turn, clinical
law students serve clients with civil and criminal justice needs that would otherwise go unmet.
Though we have these laudable teaching and service goals—and a vast literature
describing the role of clinics in both the teaching and service dimensions—we have scant
empirical evidence about whether and how clinics achieve these goals. We know from studies
that law students value clinics, but do clinics prepare them to be lawyers? We also know from
surveys that clinics provide hundreds of thousands of hours of free legal aid in low-income
communities, but how well do clinic students serve clients?
These are big questions across a complex field and set of practices that cannot be
answered by a single study. Nevertheless, we report here findings from a large data set of
cases that shed some light on the teaching-service promise of law school clinics. Analyzing
thousands of unemployment insurance cases involving different types of representation, we are
able to compare clinical law students’ use of legal procedures and outcomes to those of
experienced attorneys in cases in the same court.
We find that clinical law students behave very similarly to practicing attorneys in their
use of legal procedures. Their clients also experience very similar case outcomes to clients of
practicing attorneys. Though further research is needed on the impact of law school clinics in
the teaching and service dimensions, our findings are consistent with claims that law school
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clinics help prepare students to be practicing lawyers and to serve low-income clients as well
as lawyers do.
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INTRODUCTION

The legal profession and law schools are grappling with two
pressing and related concerns. First, given the high cost of legal
education and the tight legal job market, what is the most effective
way to prepare young lawyers for practice? Second, given the
substantial unmet legal needs of low- and middle-income people, how
can law schools help to fill the so-called “justice gap”?
Law school clinics are posited as one solution to both challenges.
Clinics are a key site in the law curriculum where students receive
hands-on training in the practice of law. They typically represent real
clients under the close supervision of law school faculty. Most clinics
also provide free legal services to clients of low and modest means,
including in settings analogous to civil legal aid and public defender
offices.
Yet we know surprisingly little about what law school clinics
deliver in the teaching and service dimensions. As is the case with
legal education more generally, to date we have not examined the
extent to which law school clinics actually prepare students for
practice. Likewise, we have scant data about how well law school
clinic students perform on behalf of their clients.
This Article sheds new light on these central questions about
clinical legal education by analyzing a substantial data set of process
and outcome measures in unemployment insurance (UI) cases:
First, we investigate how well law school clinics teach students to
practice by comparing how often clinical law students use legal
procedures in UI cases compared to attorneys practicing in the same
court. We find that clinical law students and attorneys use procedures
at very similar rates, suggesting that clinical law students are
practicing like attorneys in this setting.
Second, we explore how well clinical law students serve their
clients by comparing the outcomes in UI cases where workers are
represented by clinical law students to the outcomes of workers
represented by attorneys in the same court. We find that case
outcomes are similar for workers represented by law students and
attorneys, which suggests that clinic students are serving their clients
at a lawyer-quality standard of care.
In Part II of this Article, we discuss the teaching and service
promise of law school clinics, including how little we know about
whether and how they achieve such promise. In Part III, we describe
our study methods, including the research setting and study
population. In Part IV, we report our findings on how clinic students’
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use of procedural tactics and case outcomes compare to attorneys. We
conclude by assessing the implications of our findings for legal
education and the provision of legal services.
II.

THE TEACHING-SERVICE PROMISE OF LAW SCHOOL CLINICS

Law school clinics were founded with a dual teaching-service
mission.1 In the teaching dimension, law clinics provide hands-on
training to prepare students for the practice and profession of law. In
the service dimension, they provide legal assistance to low- and
moderate-income clients in need. Scholars have described and
debated the tension between these goals since the inception of clinical
legal education.2
While the teaching-service theory of clinical legal education is
well developed, there have been few efforts to measure whether and
how law school clinics are achieving these goals.3 Such measurement
will help us better understand each of these goals for law school
clinics, legal education, and the profession. In this Part, we briefly
describe what we know about the teaching and service missions of
law school clinics, much of which derives from a descriptive literature
written by clinical scholars.

1.
See, e.g., Douglas A. Blaze, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of
Clinical Education, 64 TENN. L. REV. 939, 953 (1997) (“[I]t is important . . . that community
service fall within the proper scope of law school educational activity to the extent that
service affords demonstrably sound, pedagogic opportunities for the education of law
students.” (quoting Charles H. Miller, Living Professional Responsibility, in CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT: LEGAL EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETTING 99, 101 (1973))
(emphasis omitted)); see also Lauren Carasik, Justice in the Balance: An Evaluation of One
Clinic’s Ability to Harmonize Teaching Practical Skills, Ethics and Professionalism with a
Social Justice Mission, 16 REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 23, 30 n.31 (2006) (“Navigating the balance
between learning and service has been a challenge from the inception of clinical legal
education.”).
2.
See Margaret Drew & Andrew P. Morriss, Clinical Legal Education and Access
to Justice: Conflicts, Interests, and Evolution, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 194, 194-95 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016); Ann
Juergens, Teach Your Students Well: Valuing Clients in the Law School Clinic, 2 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 339, 344-45 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing:
The Role of Law School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997,
999 (2004) (“From the outset tensions emerged between the public service goals of the first
generation of clinical teachers and their funders, on the one hand, and the academic values of
law school faculties on the other. The faculties, to the extent they were not openly hostile to
the introduction of experiential learning into the curriculum, as many were, were more
concerned with the educational value of clinical programs than with the newly hired
supervising attorneys’ legal services and social justice motivations.” (citation omitted)).
3.
See Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Lab Office, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 145;
Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, Legal Aid, Law School Clinics and the Opportunity for Joint
Gain, MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J., Winter 2007, at 28.
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Law School Clinics as Sites of Teaching

The teaching mission of law school clinics is part of the broader
goal of law schools to educate lawyers. Legal education has
approached this educational goal in different ways over time. Even
now, the profession and academy grapple with describing and
implementing the teaching mission of law schools.
Defining the teaching mission of law school clinics has animated
decades of thinking, deliberation, experimentation, and advocacy in
the field.4 The 2007 Carnegie Report on legal education is central to
the current debate.5 It posits that legal education is composed of three
apprenticeships, or types of learning: knowledge, practice, and
professionalism.
The knowledge apprenticeship “focuses the student on the
knowledge and way of thinking of the profession. . . . In professional
schools, the intellectual training is focused on the academic
knowledge base of the domain, including the habits of mind that the
faculty judge most important to the profession.”6
The practice apprenticeship introduces students “to the forms of
expert practice shared by competent practitioners. Students encounter
this practice-based kind of learning . . . . by taking part in simulated
practice situations, as in case studies, or in actual clinical experience
with real clients.”7
The professionalism apprenticeship “introduces students to the
purposes and attitudes that are guided by the values for which the
professional community is responsible . . . . The essential goal,
4.
See Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for
This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 16-18 (2000), for an overview of
the history and development of clinical legal education. The learning mission of clinical legal
education has its roots in legal realism, dating to well before law school clinics existed in their
present form. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Jerome Frank,
Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). This history continues in
more recent efforts to formalize such goals for legal education more generally. See, e.g., ROY
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP (2007);
ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 233-36 (1992).
5.
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]. The Carnegie Report’s concept
of “three apprenticeships” has been highly influential, motivating the current active
redefinition of law school education, including defining and measuring learning outcomes, by
the ABA. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL
OF LAW SCHOOLS 2016-2017, at 15-16 (2016) (echoing the structure of knowledge, practice,
and professionalism).
6.
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 28.
7.
Id.
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however, is to teach the skills and inclinations, along with the ethical
standards, social roles, and responsibilities that mark the
professional.”8
Though the Carnegie Report describes each apprenticeship
separately, it acknowledges and recommends that all three
apprenticeships be integrated throughout the law school experience.
Consistent with the Carnegie Report, one way of thinking about
the teaching goals of law school clinics is to ask whether and how
they develop in students the sufficient knowledge, practice skills, and
professionalism to become lawyers. A related way to frame the
teaching mission of law school clinics is to consider how they help
students learn to be attorneys who use strategic expertise—that
specific value that attorneys bring to a case.9
Of course, other important goals have been articulated for
clinical legal education that overlap with the teaching and service
missions of clinics.10 We have a rich literature on law school clinics as
sites of training students to pursue social justice.11 Clinics also strive
8.
Id.
9.
In an earlier article, three of the authors built on existing socio-legal theories of
professional expertise to develop the concept of strategic expertise to help understand what
representation may contribute to parties. Strategic expertise is “combining knowledge of the
underlying legal framework with the particularities of a given civil legal setting, including
individual personalities and preferences, and exercising judgment to apply this knowledge to
a particular client’s circumstance.” Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark,
Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, 93 DENV. L. REV. 469, 510 (2016); see also
HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 38-39
(2001) (describing how a lawyer with professional expertise can be a better advocate for
clients); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational
and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 909, 915-16 (2015)
(describing professional expertise in a legal setting and its effect on litigation outcomes).
10. For recent examples, see Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective
Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355 (2008) (arguing for broader social change roles for
law school clinics); Steven Keith Berenson, Preparing Clinical Law Students for Advocacy in
Poor People’s Courts, 43 N.M. L. REV. 363 (2013) (asserting that clinics are a bridge from
theory to practice because they develop skills and give an understanding of how the justice
system really works); Anna E. Carpenter, The Project Model of Clinical Education: Eight
Principles to Maximize Student Learning and Social Justice Impact, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 39
(2013) (describing the educational benefits of project work in clinics); Becky L. Jacobs,
Cultivating Purposeful Curiosity in a Clinical Setting: Extrapolating from Case to Social
Justice, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 371 (2015) (connecting the clinical mode of cultivating curiosity
with research finding that curious students are more academically successful); Sara K.
Rankin, The Fully Formed Lawyer: Why Law Schools Should Require Public Service to
Better Prepare Students for Private Practice, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 17 (2013) (describing clinical
settings as opportunities for skills training, creating professional identity, and promoting
psychological health).
11. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on
Clinical Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETTING, supra note 1, at 374-75; Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases on
the Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community
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to develop reflective practitioners with the ability and motivation to
learn from their own experiences.12 Each of these goals, though not
explicitly articulated in the terms of the Carnegie Report, are captured
by the report’s three apprenticeships. But if law school clinics have
the overarching teaching goal of training students to become attorneys
with sufficient knowledge, practice skills, and professionalism, are
they achieving this goal?
Despite clinical education’s focus on assessment and evaluation,
and in the face of robust calls for empirical research, we have limited
data on whether and how law school clinic students are learning to be
lawyers.13 In general, the literature is replete with descriptions of law
school clinics and the learning that occurs in them.14 There have been
limited and varied attempts to expand this analysis to measure
learning outcomes.15

Lawyering Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 333, 335 (2009); Carasik, supra note 1, at 24-25;
Wizner & Aiken, supra note 2, at 998-99; Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7
CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 327 (2001). This goal is also captured in other articulations of
education for the profession. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble para. 1 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2016) (adopted in whole or in part by forty-nine of the fifty states and beginning:
“A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a . . . public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.”); MACCRATE ET AL., supra note 4, at 333 (“Law
school deans, professors, administrators and staff should be concerned to convey to students
that the professional value of the need to promote justice, fairness and morality is an essential
ingredient of the legal profession . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Russell
Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We
Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 169 (2001) (concluding that “teaching . . .
fundamental lawyering skills and values to help prepare law graduates for practice” is a
burden to be borne not solely by clinics but law schools as a whole).
12. See Brodie, supra note 11, at 353; Donald A. Schön, Educating the Reflective
Legal Practitioner, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 231, 250 (1995).
13. See, e.g., Charn & Selbin, supra note 3, at 147; Roy Stuckey, Teaching with
Purpose: Defining and Achieving Desired Outcomes in Clinical Law Courses, 13 CLINICAL L.
REV. 807, 808-09 (2007).
14. See, e.g., Jane H. Aiken et al., The Learning Contract in Legal Education, 44 MD.
L. REV. 1047 (1985); Carasik, supra note 1; David F. Chavkin, Matchmaker, Matchmaker:
Student Collaboration in Clinical Programs, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 199 (1994); Peter Toll
Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277;
Philip G. Schrag, Constructing a Clinic, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 175 (1996); Colleen F.
Shanahan, Cultivating Justice for the Working Poor: Clinical Representation of
Unemployment Claimants, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 401 (2011).
15. Other professions are also struggling to measure directly whether clinical
education is meeting learning goals. See, e.g., Brenda Happell, The Importance of Clinical
Experience for Mental Health Nursing—Part 1: Undergraduate Nursing Students’ Attitudes,
Preparedness and Satisfaction, 17 INT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 326 (2008) (using a
survey of student perceptions to measure preparedness for practice); Roy Remmen et al.,
Effectiveness of Basic Clinical Skills Training Programmes: A Cross-Sectional Comparison
of Four Medical Schools, 35 MED. EDUC. 121, 121 (2001) (finding improvement in scores on
a written test of skills after hands-on clerkship experience).
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One approach is to ask how young lawyers perceive clinical legal
education. Multiple studies have found young lawyers rate clinical
training highly compared to other law school experiences for making
the transition to practice.16 Other studies have tried to connect clinical
experience to employment outcomes or other post-graduation
behaviors, with mixed results.17 Another approach is to measure a
particular skill performed by students with and without clinical
experience. One study of a program with a significant clinical
component found that students in that program performed better in
client interviews than students without the experience.18
None of these approaches to measurement squarely addresses
whether law school clinics are preparing students with the knowledge,
skills, and professionalism to function as attorneys—it is a complex
task to define and measure professional training. Still, one way to
assess whether law school clinics are achieving their teaching mission
is to compare clinical law students to the “standard of care” of
practicing attorneys.19 Our data allow us to measure whether clinical
law students perform similarly as lawyers do in the same advocacy
setting.
Implicit in the choice to compare law students with practicing
attorneys is the assumption that attorneys are an appropriate “standard
of care” against which to judge student performance. This is not an
16. See Engler, supra note 11, at 135-38 (reporting data demonstrating that students
who participated in pro bono legal clinics acquired valuable legal skills through their
participation in clinics); Margaret E. Reuter & Joanne Ingham, The Practice Value of
Experiential Legal Education: An Examination of Enrollment Patterns, Course Intensity, and
Career Relevance, 22 CLINICAL L. REV. 181 (2015); Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The
Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 57, 85-90 (2009) (describing a national survey of young
lawyers showing that clinical training is highly rated compared to other law school
experiences for making the transition to practice).
17. See Robert R. Kuehn, Measuring Clinical Legal Education’s Employment
Outcomes, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 645 (refuting claims that clinical experiences do not improve
law graduates’ employment outcomes and reporting data that suggest clinical experiences are
important to employers and help some students secure employment); Sandefur & Selbin,
supra note 16 (finding no evidence of a relationship between clinical experience and pro bono
service or civic participation, and a strong relationship with sustaining original civic
commitments); Jason Webb Yackee, Does Experiential Learning Improve JD Employment
Outcomes?, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 601.
18. ALLI GERKMAN & ELENA HARMAN, AHEAD OF THE CURVE: TURNING LAW
STUDENTS INTO LAWYERS 1 (2015) (finding that “[t]he only significant predictor of
standardized client interview performance was whether or not the interviewer participated in
the . . . Honors Program. Neither LSAT scores nor class rank was significantly predictive of
interview performance.”).
19. See Jane H. Aiken & Stephen Wizner, Measuring Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 79,
89-91; Ann Shalleck, Thought and Advocacy About Student Debt: Representation of LowIncome Borrowers in Law School Clinical Programs, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 760-61
(2015).
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objective evaluation of the quality of lawyering by attorneys. Rather,
the reality of our civil justice system and the site of this study is that
these attorneys are the logical, available comparison. This approach is
consistent with both legal frameworks and related research. There are
legal standards for assessing the quality of lawyering, such as in
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the criminal setting and
malpractice claims in the civil setting, and these standards operate by
comparison to a generic conception of other attorneys.20 In addition,
studies of paralegals and similar professionals in other legal systems
have similarly used a generic, typical attorney as the standard of care
against which the other service provider is measured.21 Comparing
students to practicing attorneys, rather than a hypothetical or idealized
lawyer, therefore, seems to be a reasonable way to measure whether
and how law school clinics are meeting their teaching goals.22

20. There are two obvious analogies where the law evaluates reasonable
representation relative to other attorneys. The first is the ineffective assistance of counsel
standard in criminal law. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984)
(establishing that a counsel’s performance is deficient if it “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and if a reasonable probability exists that the proceeding would have been
different but for counsel’s errors); see also John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like
Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a
(Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 127, 131-32, 134 (2007) (discussing the evolution of the effective assistance of
counsel standard from “farce and mockery” to “within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys” to Strickland’s “objective standard of reasonableness,” which “was only a slight
improvement to the farce and mockery test, if an improvement at all” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The second is the standard for legal malpractice in civil law. See Sav. Bank
v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1879) (establishing a “reasonable degree of care and skill” as the
basis for legal malpractice actions); see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and
the Structure of Negligence Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 673 n.151 (1998) (surveying
each state’s reasonableness standard).
21. See, e.g., RICHARD MOORHEAD ET AL., QUALITY AND COST: FINAL REPORT ON THE
CONTRACTING OF CIVIL, NON-FAMILY ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE PILOT 3 (2001) (UK); Mary
Anne Noone, Paralegals and Legal Aid Organisations, 4 J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 146 (1988)
(Can.). For a different perspective on standardization, see Karen Barton et al., Valuing What
Clients Think: Standardized Clients and the Assessment of Communicative Competence, 13
CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing legal education’s adoption of medical education’s use
of “standardized” client actors to simulate legal situations and provide feedback on
interviewing skills in the United Kingdom).
22. This is a different question than what the learning goal of a law school clinic
should be, which may well be to guide students to be better than average attorneys. See
Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning
to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV.
284, 305 (1981) (“The student must be encouraged to aim beyond the typical standard of the
marketplace . . . .”).
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Law School Clinics as Sites of Service

Clinical legal education has a deeply rooted service mission. As
others have noted, “One of the primary reasons for having a clinic was
to engage a law school more directly in providing . . . representation
[for the poor in both criminal and civil cases].”23 This service mission
was born in the 1960s of two motivations: “to make law schools
relevant to the career aspirations of antipoverty lawyers and to urgent
calls for social and economic justice.”24 The mission—though now
more frequently labeled as a social justice mission—continues to be a
source of inspiration and examination for law school clinics.25
As clinical legal education has grown, these service goals have
broadened from providing direct representation to indigent litigants to
policy advocacy, transactional advice, and community organizing
support to those who would not otherwise have access to professional
assistance. 26 Despite the evolution and expansion of models of
clinical legal education, the service mission persists.27
Although many of us believe law school clinics’ low- and
moderate-income clients are better off with the assistance of law
students than without, we have limited empirical evidence to support
our views.28 As with the teaching mission, the literature is replete
with descriptions of law school clinics serving clients, whether

23. Wizner & Aiken, supra note 2, at 997-98; see Marc Feldman, On the Margins of
Legal Education, 13 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 607, 637-38 (1984-85); Stephen Wizner &
Dennis Curtis, “Here’s What We Do”: Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673, 678-80 (1980).
24. Charn & Selbin, supra note 3, at 149; see Bellow, supra note 11, at 374-76;
Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
581, 586-87 (1976).
25. See Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287 (2001);
Stephen Wizner, Is Social Justice Still Relevant?, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 345 (2012).
26. See Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International
Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 505, 532-34 (2003); Dina Schlossberg, An
Examination of Transactional Law Clinics and Interdisciplinary Education, 11 J.L. & POL’Y
195, 195 (2003). In recent years, some clinicians have questioned whether law clinics must
necessarily pursue a service goal at all. See Praveen Kosuri, Losing My Religion: The Place
of Social Justice in Clinical Legal Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 331, 337-38 (2012).
27. See Carolyn Grose, Beyond Skills Training, Revisited: The Clinical Education
Spiral, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 489, 496 (2013); Wizner, supra note 25, at 353 (“Law school
clinics can maintain their focus on the provision of legal services to low income and other
under-represented clients in all of their clinical work, whether it be direct individual client
service, impact litigation, transactional lawyering, legislative advocacy, environmental
defense practice, or any of the other increasingly varied legal activities in which
contemporary law school clinics are engaged.”)
28. See, e.g., JEANNE CHARN & RICHARD ZORZA, CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR ALL
AMERICANS 38 (2005); Charn & Selbin, supra note 3, at 161-67.
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individuals or broader legal causes.29 While we have a rich and
compelling literature extolling the virtues of clinic service,30 we know
surprisingly little about service outcomes in the clinical setting.
Indeed, scholars are only now beginning to understand and
measure what “serving a client” means for legal services more
generally. There is a broad, spirited effort underway to expand our
empirical understanding of representation and other access to justice
interventions.31 Just as we are only now starting to measure legal
29. See Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable
Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct
Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879 (1999) (describing particular clinics); Susan Bryant &
Maria Arias, Case Study: A Battered Women’s Rights Clinic: Designing a Clinical Program
Which Encourages a Problem-Solving Vision of Lawyering That Empowers Clients and
Community, 42 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207 (1992) (discussing a particular clinic); Carasik,
supra note 1 (describing a particular clinic); Maurice Emsellem & Monica Halas,
Representation of Claimants at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings: Identifying
Models and Proposed Solutions, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 327-28 (1995-96) (describing
clinical education as a valuable community resource providing high-quality representation);
Jill I. Gross & Ronald W. Filante, Developing a Law/Business Collaboration Through Pace’s
Securities Arbitration Clinic, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 57, 77-79 (2005) (describing
how the authors’ model meets the multiple needs of clients, law students, and graduate
business students); Jennifer Jack & Mary Lynch, Law School Clinics and Their Communities,
in TOWN AND GOWN: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION 267 (Cynthia A.
Baker & Patricia E. Salkin eds., 2013) (highlighting the various benefits that a law school
clinic provides to the community in which it is situated); Kevin R. Johnson & Amagda Pérez,
Clinical Legal Education and the U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into
Practice and Practice into Theory, 51 SMU L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1998) (examining the
question of whether clinical legal education, often implemented in programs providing legal
assistance to subordinated communities, does any good for those communities); Dale
Margolin et al., Empowerment, Innovation, and Service: Law School Programs Provide
Access to Justice and Instill a Commitment to Serve, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 672 (2010) (describing
five programs and their benefits to students and clients); Shanahan, supra note 14.
30. See, e.g., Juergens, supra note 2, at 348-49 (asserting that client interests are
served by clinics, perhaps even better than by private law firms, and also recognizing that the
comparison between clinic representation and no representation may be careless); Michael
Millemann, Implementing Maryland Law School’s Mandatory Clinical Requirement, MD.
B.J., July 2014, at 46, 48-49 (providing examples of positive impact of law school clinic
work).
31. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical
Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 101-02; Deborah L. Rhode, Access to
Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and Research, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 532, 542-45
(2013) (identifying need for adequate research on access to justice and advising on datagathering strategy). Examples of recent empirical access to justice research include D. James
Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What
Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012);
Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Domestic Violence and the Politics of Self-Help, 22 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 203 (2016); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, From Victims to Litigants, 67 HASTINGS
L.J. 1299 (2016); Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan & Rebecca Gill, Justice on the Fly: The
Danger of Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (2014); Rebecca L. Sandefur, The
Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 51, 69-71
(2010); Mary Spector & Ann Baddour, Collection Texas-Style: An Analysis of Consumer
Collection Practices In and Out of the Courts, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1427 (2016); Jessica K.
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services outcomes, we also have very little data about clinical law
students and their role in civil justice.32
Beyond pairing the assertions that there are legal needs and that
law school clinics provide free legal services,33 only a few studies
have tried to measure the service mission of clinics. One study has
attempted to survey and count representation in clinics.34 The only
randomized controlled trial to measure outcomes of law school clinic
representation concluded that an offer of representation—not actual
representation in the legal proceeding—did not improve case
outcomes and delayed case adjudication.35
Our data allow us to observe case outcomes for clients
represented by student attorneys in individual representation matters.
As with the teaching mission of law school clinics, we can observe
clinical law student representation by reference to practicing attorneys
in the same setting. Our data also allow us to measure whether
clinical law students achieve service outcomes on behalf of clients
that are comparable to service outcomes for clients represented by
attorneys.
While individual litigation representation by students is only one
way in which law school clinics achieve a service mission, it is a
common and easily measurable one. And, of course, measuring case
outcomes in clinical legal education does not account for less tangible
contributions to clients’ experiences.36 However, the data presented in
Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal
Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453 (2011).
32. See Charn & Selbin, supra note 3, at 154-61; see also Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service
Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the
Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 53-54 (2012) (acknowledging lack of
empirical data on the impact of clinic client services).
33. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1785
(2001); LEGAL SERVICES CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/
TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf.
34. ROBERT R. KUEHN & DAVID A. SANTACROCE, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED
LEGAL EDUC., 2013-2014 SURVEY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION 27 (2015), www.csale.
org/files/Report_on_2013-14_CSALE_Survey.pdf (“Extrapolating to all law clinics at all
ABA-accredited law schools, the estimated total number of clients provided with free civil
legal services by clinics during the 2012-13 academic year was over 70,000.” (emphasis and
citation omitted)).
35. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 31, at 2149-63. For an in-depth discussion of
some of the limits of the Greiner & Pattanayak study, see Selbin et al., supra note 32.
36. Aiken & Wizner, supra note 19, at 81-83, 90-91; Tom R. Tyler, What Is
Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures,
22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128 (1988) (finding that citizens reacted positively to a legal
system that employed procedural fairness, regardless of their case outcome); Yale Law
School, Inaugural Lecture of Tom Tyler, Macklin Fleming Professor of Law, VIMEO (Dec. 10,
2012), http://vimeo.com/56986325 (identifying the elements of procedural fairness as
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this Article provide a valuable opportunity in the face of limited
empirical research to measure the case outcomes of people
represented by clinic students.
III. THE STUDY
Our study draws on a large data set of unemployment insurance
(UI) cases in the District of Columbia (D.C.) Office of Administrative
Hearings (OAH).37 The data set includes quantitative data from more
than 5000 UI cases heard in the OAH from January 2011 to June
2013 and qualitative data from interviews with representatives and
judges who participated in these cases. This is not a random sample
of all available cases—it includes every such case in D.C. during the
study period.38
In this Part, we describe the background of our study, the study
setting (the relevant court and its procedures), and our data (including
methodological limitations).
A.

Study Background

This study is a part of a larger research agenda designed to help
understand how representation impacts access to justice in the context
of retail level civil courts. From the available court data, we have
examined the balance of power between parties, the use of procedures
for represented and unrepresented parties, and nonlawyer
representation.39
In Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, we found that parties
generally have better case outcomes when represented but that
(1) having a voice in the legal process; (2) having the outcome explained clearly; and
(3) being treated with respect).
37. For a more detailed discussion of our previous analysis of the data, see Anna E.
Carpenter, Alyx Mark & Colleen F. Shanahan, Trial and Error: Lawyers and Nonlawyer
Advocates, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1023 (2017) [hereinafter Carpenter, Mark & Shanahan,
Trial and Error]; Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little
Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1367 (2016) [hereinafter
Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, A Little Representation]; Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, supra
note 9. In addition, data from the same study has informed additional analysis of the role of
judges in access to justice. See Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Carpenter, Active Judging]; Colleen F.
Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access to Justice,
2018 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom].
38. Our data do not consider the subset of unemployment appeals regarding eligibility
and benefit calculation, as these appeals involve a state agency rather than the employer as the
opposing party.
39. See Carpenter, Mark & Shanahan, Trial and Error, supra note 37; Shanahan,
Carpenter & Mark, A Little Representation, supra note 37; Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark,
supra note 9.
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employers see less benefit from representation than workers.40 We
also found that represented parties are more likely to use procedures
than unrepresented parties but that represented workers who use
certain evidentiary procedures had worse case outcomes than
represented workers who did not use those same procedures. To
understand this surprising final finding, we developed the theory of
strategic expertise.41
To further understand strategic expertise, we analyzed data
concerning representation for employers. Employer representation is
particularly interesting because our data include both attorney and
nonlawyer representation for employers, and nonlawyer practice is the
subject of much discussion and reform in the United States.42 In Trial
and Error: Lawyer and Nonlawyer Advocates, we found that
experienced nonlawyers can help parties navigate common court
procedures and basic legal concepts.43 We also discovered that judges
were a critical force in shaping nonlawyer legal expertise and that this
expertise developed almost exclusively through trial and error. 44
Further, we found evidence that while nonlawyers could provide basic
assistance to parties, they were not equipped to advance novel legal
claims or advocate for law reform.45
In Can a Little Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, we
explored how access to justice interventions that provide a little
representation, such as nonlawyer representation, are valuable but
risky.46 When a litigant receives assistance with a discrete legal need
in a specific moment and that assistance is part of a system that is
incompatible with challenging or developing the law, our own legal
system is at risk of developing in a way that does not structurally
address the needs of low- and middle-income litigants.47
This Article addresses the teaching and service outcomes of
clinical law students by comparing them to attorney representatives.
Our previous work has led us to examine the strategic expertise that
attorneys and nonlawyer advocates use in utilizing procedure and
representing clients. The additional data allow us to explore new,
related questions: whether law school clinics prepare students for
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
1371-72.
47.

Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, supra note 9, at 469-70.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, A Little Representation, supra note 37, at 1379-80.
Carpenter, Mark & Shanahan, Trial and Error, supra note 37, at 24-29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
See Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, A Little Representation, supra note 37, at
Id. at 1387.
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practice by teaching them to act as attorneys, including exercising
strategic expertise, and whether clinic students serve clients as well as
practicing attorneys do.
B.

Study Setting

The OAH is a professionalized central administrative court
where Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) hear all UI appeals in D.C.48
This process begins when the claimant (worker) files for benefits with
the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
(DOES), and one party—the employer or the worker—subsequently
appeals the grant or denial of benefits by DOES to the OAH.49 The
OAH proceedings are de novo, which means the ALJ reaches a
decision without regard to DOES’s initial determination.50
In UI cases, the worker is presumptively entitled to benefits; the
employer has the legal burden to prove otherwise.51 Because the
claimant is presumed qualified for benefits, hearings begin with the
employer’s case-in-chief, including witnesses and documentary
evidence.52 The worker may then present witnesses or documents.
The ALJ may ask questions of either party and may also allow the
employer to present a rebuttal case. Because the review is de novo
and the employer has the burden of proof, if a claimant attends the
hearing and the employer does not, the claimant automatically wins.53
By rule, the OAH requires parties to send to the court and the
opposing party, at least three days prior to the hearing, the documents
and witnesses that the party plans to offer (excepting those that may
be used to impeach or rebut) at the hearing. 54 This “three-day
disclosure rule” poses different strategic considerations for workers
and employers. Workers, who do not bear the burden of proof, may
choose not to disclose a document in advance but to use it later only if
necessary for impeachment or rebuttal. Conversely, employers have
48. About OAH, OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, http://oah.dc.gov/page/about-oah (last
visited Oct. 27, 2017). These hearings are what Russell Engler has dubbed “poor people’s
courts.” Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data
Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 39 (2010); see also
Shanahan, supra note 14, at 401-02 (describing the unemployment insurance system as a
place of individual and systematic injustice).
49. See Shanahan, supra note 14, at 403.
50. See Rodriguez v. Filene’s Basement Inc., 905 A.2d 177, 179-80 (D.C. 2006).
51. See id. at 179; D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2822 (2016).
52. See D.C. CODE § 51-111 (2016) (providing minimal guidelines for hearing
procedure); see also D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2822 (establishing an employer’s burden of
proof).
53. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2822.4; Rodriguez, 905 A.2d at 180.
54. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2985.1.
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stronger strategic reasons to disclose documents or witnesses,
especially because the failure to disclose may lead to exclusion of the
evidence at the hearing and thus prevent the employer from meeting
its burden of proof.
C.

The Data

The OAH maintains electronic records and paper files on all UI
cases before the court. For each case heard in OAH from January
2011 through December 2013, we collected data from the court’s
electronic case management system and paper case files. Using a
structured collection and coding system, we gathered information on
dozens of variables for each case, including basic case characteristics,
the types of parties and representatives, the legal procedures deployed
in each case, and case outcomes.55
We also performed structured qualitative interviews with
representatives for workers and employers. We contacted all of the
regularly practicing representatives in these cases and completed
interviews with the majority of these individuals. Those individuals
who were not interviewed did not respond to our requests for
interviews. These interviews included the directors of law school
clinics that are active in this court, the three attorneys who most
commonly represent workers in these cases, and the attorneys and
nonlawyer representatives who regularly appear on behalf of
employers.56 All of these representatives are “repeat players” in UI
cases.57
Finally, we conducted structured, open-ended interviews with
judges who heard cases in the time period for which we have
quantitative data. We contacted all sixteen of the judges who heard
cases over the time period studied and ultimately interviewed twelve
of them. Three of the judges who were not interviewed did not

55. For a more detailed description of our data collection, see Carpenter, Mark &
Shanahan, Trial and Error, supra note 37, at 9; Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, supra note 9, at
518-21.
56. Two of the authors supervised clinical law students in these same cases in more
than a hundred cases combined over five years, and the qualitative experience of those
hearings and of our general experience with the operation of this court and clerk’s office also
informs our analysis. We note that information specifically in our findings when relevant.
Our access to the data was possible because of relationships with OAH judges formed
through this clinic representation. See Charn & Selbin, supra note 3.
57. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 95, 97 (1974).
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respond to our requests, and one judge had been appointed to a higher
court and declined to be interviewed.58
It is important to note that this is an observational, retrospective
study. We do not use a randomized design due to the nature of the
data and the ethical challenges of randomizing representation.59 The
data in this study include every unemployment case in the court over a
two-and-a-half-year period where the worker’s separation from
employment is at issue. This type of observational study provides a
more comprehensive picture than a randomized study focused on a
limited intervention.
To analyze the data, we use statistical methods to compare
groups and demonstrate the correlative relationships between
representation and case and procedural outcomes. We use qualitative
data to add interpretive context to the quantitative analysis. We report
our quantitative findings as comparisons, and we do not make causal
claims. 60 Though not randomized, this large, population-sized
sample—with extensive data on each case and qualitative information
across the data—allows us to explore questions of clinical teaching
and service.
IV. THE FINDINGS
In this Part, we describe the findings of our study. We first
report rates and types of representation in the UI court, including
levels of preparation. We next share data comparing clinical law
students’ use of key legal procedures in UI cases with attorneys’ use
of such tactics in similar cases. These comparisons shed light on
whether students in law school clinics are learning to be attorneys.
58. Though not discussed in depth here, two forthcoming articles address questions
of judging and access to justice using data from the same study site. See Carpenter, Active
Judging, supra note 37; Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom, supra note 37.
59. We also note that much of our analysis involves comparing parties with different
types of representation (attorneys, law students, and lay advocates). While this does not
eliminate all potential selection bias, all of the parties in these comparisons sought
representation and obtained it. Thus, these comparisons avoid concerns about the differences
between parties (and the cases of those parties) who seek representation and those who do
not.
60. For example, “represented claimants have a higher win rate than unrepresented
claimants.” Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, supra note 9, at 487 n.71. For ease of expression,
we do not reiterate each time we describe a finding that this describes two distinct groups: the
group of claimants in the data who were represented and the group of claimants in the data
who were not represented, rather than the experience of a single claimant exposed to the
presence and absence of the variable of representation. In addition, we use the word
“significant” to report statistically significant findings. All of the differences described here
are statistically significant unless explicitly described otherwise. For more about our
methodology, see id. at 518-21.
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Finally, we compare case outcomes among types of representation and
then narrow our inquiry to case outcomes in relation to the use of
procedural tactics. These comparisons tell us something about
whether law school clinics are serving their clients as well as
practicing attorneys.
A.

Legal Representation of Parties

One of the interesting attributes of the study site is the variety of
legal representatives who appear on behalf of the parties (workers and
employers). Many workers and employers represent themselves.
Parties with representation are represented by attorneys, law students,
and lay (nonlawyer) advocates. Among workers, we can compare
clinic student representation with lawyer representation, in contrast to
employers, who are represented by lawyers and nonlawyer or lay
representatives.61
1.

Rates and Types of Representation

Workers and employers in our study have different rates of
representation, as depicted in Chart 1. In almost half of all cases,
neither the worker nor the employer has representation. In about 10%
of the cases, both parties are represented. In 9% of the cases, only the
worker is represented, while in 32% of the cases, only the employer is
represented. Overall, workers are represented in 19% of the cases and
employers are represented in 42% of the cases.
Chart 1: Overall Rates of Representation
(n=5152)
Only Worker
Represented
9%
Both
Represented
10%

No
Representation
49%
Only Employer
Represented
32%

61. See Carpenter, Mark & Shanahan, Trial and Error, supra note 37; Shanahan,
Carpenter & Mark, A Little Representation, supra note 37. As discussed in our earlier
articles, previous studies of nonlawyer representation have typically included this type of lay
representation. See, e.g., KRITZER, supra note 9, at 1-6.
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OAH rules allow nonlawyers to appear in unemployment
appeals. As a result, workers and employers have different types of
representation.
As depicted in Chart 2, in the 19% of total cases in which
workers are represented, 86% have an attorney and 14% have a
clinical law student. As depicted in Chart 3, in the 42% of all cases in
which employers are represented, 39% have an attorney and 61%
have a nonlawyer representative. Although workers are less than half
as likely as employers to be represented in UI cases at the OAH (19%
versus 42%), when they are represented, they are much more likely
than employers to be represented by a lawyer (86% versus 39%).
Chart 2:
Worker Representation
n=950

Chart 3:
Employer
Representation
n=2163

Clinical
Law
Student
14%
Nonlawyer
61%

Attorney
39%

Attorney
86%

The attorneys for workers come largely from the District of
Columbia AFL-CIO’s Claimant Advocacy Program, which is involved
in 88% of such cases. The AFL-CIO lawyers have practiced
exclusively in UI appeals in the District for more than fifteen years.
The Legal Aid Society of D.C. began representing workers in 2011
and provides lawyers in 2% of such cases. 62 Both of these
organizations provide representation for free. The attorneys who
regularly represent workers in these cases are a handful of individuals

62. Approximately 10% of the workers’ attorneys in our data set appeared only a
single time.
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with extensive experience in this court. As such, these attorneys can
be said to be repeat players.63
The clinical law students come from Georgetown, George
Washington, American, and Catholic Universities, where they are
closely supervised by full-time clinical faculty or supervising
attorneys housed in the law schools.64 Services are provided for free.
Under OAH rules, clinical law students can only appear at hearings
with a supervising attorney. The attorneys from the law school clinics
who accompany students to hearings include clinic directors, whose
experience in these cases ranges from several years to almost two
decades, and teaching fellows, who supervise students for one or two
years at a time. Though law clinics as institutions may appear
consistently in the court, their case volume is much smaller, and an
individual student typically only appears once or twice.65
Attorneys for employers are a mixture of paid attorneys and
attorneys who provide pro bono assistance through the District’s
Employer Advocacy Program. 66 The same handful of individual
attorneys serve in both roles and are repeat players with years of
experience in these matters. Most lay representatives on the employer
side come from a human resources outsourcing industry made up of
primarily large corporations that provide this representation, among
other services. Like employers’ attorneys, many of the lay advocates
are repeat players, and many of them represent large corporate clients.
2.

Case Selection Practices Among Worker Representatives

This section describes case selection practices based on our
observation of court operations and qualitative interviews with
representatives. Workers learn of the opportunity for legal services in
two ways. First, each court order notifying a worker of her hearing
date includes a flyer with contact information for the court’s resource
center and for the Claimant Advocacy Program and Legal Aid Society.
63. Galanter, supra note 57, at 97.
64. There were no pro bono, externship, or student-run volunteer programs that
provided representation in these cases in the study time frame.
65. The nature of administrative hearings and their emphasis on the actual hearing
rather than written pleadings may lessen the nature of clinics and clinical faculty as repeat
players because judges and opposing counsel see different students each time. A recent study
examining United States Supreme Court litigation provides an example where law school
clinics may function as more classic repeat players and in fact see high success rates
compared to professional law firms. See Adam Feldman & Alexander Kappner, Finding
Certainty in Cert: An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Involved in Supreme Court Certiorari
Decisions From 2001-2015, 61 VILL. L. REV. 795 (2016).
66. See Carpenter, Mark & Shanahan, Trial and Error, supra note 37 for our detailed
analysis of employer representation and nonlawyer advocates.
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Second, the court’s resource center is located directly next to the
court’s waiting room and has prominent signs advertising the
availability of free legal assistance. Any individual who contacts the
resource center is given information about the various programs,
including law school clinics. In addition to information from the
court, various intake centers in the District will send potential clients
to the organizations for assistance with unemployment cases. A
parallel process exists for unrepresented employers.
We found wide variation in case selection criteria among those
who represent workers. In one legal services organization, the
individual attorneys make decisions about taking cases and articulate
their selection criteria as a mixture of scheduling, the merit of the
case, and the worker’s ability to make herself heard on her own
(indicating her likelihood of being a good witness). Another
organization focuses on client vulnerability and high impact cases.
Some attorneys apply predetermined client selection criteria
when choosing clients, such as prioritizing people with disabilities or
people who have experienced domestic violence. They may also use
certain case selection criteria, such as choosing clients whose cases
might lead to law reform. The legal services attorneys generally
reported giving substantial advice to individuals whose cases they
could not take, especially those cases due to scheduling conflicts.
The law school clinics similarly use a diverse combination of
screening criteria. One clinic looks for more difficult cases that
“make a difference.” Another clinic evaluates whether the worker has
a meritorious case and the relative benefit to the client, as well as
whether the case is deemed “appropriate for students” (a standard that
is highly subjective, even within a particular clinic). Still another
clinic is driven largely by scheduling, does not screen for merit at all,
and in the rare circumstances where not all potential clients can be
helped, will choose the client who seems more vulnerable. Only one
clinic reported giving limited advice to clients to whom it did not
provide full representation.
3.

Case Preparation Among Worker Representatives

We also interviewed representatives to understand their client
contact, case preparation, use of procedures, and engagement with
substantive law. This section describes our understanding of case
preparation practices based on those interviews and our own
experiences. Attorneys with legal services organizations described
somewhat less client contact in preparing a case than students in law
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clinics. However, the cases in our data set have very short timelines:
often two to three weeks from when the case is scheduled (which is
when a representative typically takes a client) to the hearing. As a
result, legal services attorneys report two to three phone calls or
meetings with a client before a hearing, and clinical law students
typically have three to four phone calls or meetings before a hearing.
We found a similar variation between attorneys and clinical law
students in their amount of investigation and factual preparation for
each case. Attorneys reported less activity in obtaining documents
and tracking down witnesses in preparing a case. In part, attorneys
said that many witnesses are not useful because of credibility or
reliability concerns and because the timing is often too short to get a
subpoena for documents. In contrast, two of the law school clinics
reported regularly using subpoenas or direct document requests of
employers to obtain documents before a hearing.
In a related contrast, the attorneys at legal services organizations
reported introducing documents and witnesses (other than the client)
less often at hearings. The explanations for this included the burden
of proof—representatives did not need to introduce evidence to win
the case. Representatives were also concerned about the risks of
putting a witness on the stand, which might lead to unwelcome
surprises and criticism from judges when trying to use evidence that
had not been disclosed in advance of the hearing pursuant to OAH
rules.
4.

Discussion

The qualitative data suggest that outcomes are not driven by case
selection bias, at least not in the sense of representatives cherry
picking only “winning” cases.67 The general lack of uniformity in
how attorneys choose clients likely mutes such concerns. In addition,
because the employer bears the burden of proof in these cases, there is
no worker who has a “bad” case. If the worker appears at the hearing
and the employer either does not appear or appears without admissible
or reliable evidence, the worker will win the case regardless of its
legal or factual “merit.”68
67. For an in-depth discussion of whether representatives select cases based on merit
and the implications of this common (and as three of the co-authors have previously argued,
incorrect) assumption for theory and research, see Carpenter, Mark & Shanahan, Trial and
Error, supra note 37.
68. In fact, many of the individual attorneys we interviewed mentioned the legal
burdens as a factor in their openness to accepting clients regardless of the circumstances of
the case.

2018]

MEASURING LAW SCHOOL CLINICS

569

The qualitative data also suggest that, while there is not wide
variation in case preparation due to the short timeline of these cases,
law school clinics at least see themselves as preparing more intensely
for these cases. In their own descriptions, this means that clinical law
students deploy procedural tools more often than practicing attorneys.
B.

Are Clinical Law Students Learning to Act like Attorneys?

The first question we address is whether students in law clinics
are learning to act like attorneys. Our data allow us to compare the
representation by clinical law students to the representation of
attorneys in similar cases before the same court. If law clinics are
effective in preparing students to become attorneys, then we expect
clinical law students to act in a manner similar to attorneys in these
cases.69 We test this hypothesis by asking whether students use
procedures in the same way as attorneys in similar cases.
Specifically, we examine three key procedural choices that
parties make in these cases: (1) pre-hearing evidence disclosure,70
(2) hearing appearances, and (3) introduction of testimony and
documents.71 The data are drawn from a single court and a single case
type docket, but the procedures used in this analysis are common ones
across state civil courts and case types. As described below, the data
suggest that clinical law students deploy all of these procedural tactics
in ways similar to attorneys.
1.

Pre-Hearing Evidence Disclosure

Parties in UI cases are required to disclose documents or
witnesses to the opposing party and the court three days prior to the
hearing.72 Chart 4 describes our findings on the rates at which
workers disclose either documents or witnesses. The disclosure data
are disaggregated by the worker’s type of representation:
unrepresented, represented by an attorney, and represented by a
clinical law student.
As a general matter, represented workers disclose pre-hearing
evidence more frequently than unrepresented workers. Unrepresented
workers disclose evidence less than 20% of the time, workers
69. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
70. Parties who disclose information using OAH’s three-day disclosure rule typically
disclose documents and rarely disclose only witnesses. Thus, we have combined these two
steps into a single model.
71. We do not separately analyze admission of documents because there are very few
documents that are introduced but not admitted in our data.
72. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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represented by attorneys disclose evidence almost 35% of the time,
and workers represented by clinical law students disclose evidence
almost 45% of the time. The difference in disclosure rates between
represented and unrepresented workers is statistically significant,
while the difference between those represented by attorneys and those
represented by clinical law students is not.73
Chart 4: Worker Pre-Hearing Evidence Disclosure
n=4181 unrepresented, 818 attorney, 132 clinic
Unrepresented Worker

Attorney-represented

Clinic Student-represented

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%

35%

45%

19%

0%
Disclosure of Evidence

2.

Hearing Appearances

The hearing is the single most crucial element of an
unemployment case. 74 Because the hearing is de novo and the
employer has the burden of proof, appearing at the hearing is very
important for both parties. We separate the appearance data by the
appearance of the worker and the representative, and also by the type
of representation: unrepresented, represented by an attorney, and
represented by a clinical law student.
Chart 5 illustrates our findings regarding both worker and
representative appearances at the hearing. Workers who are
represented appear at their hearings more often (about 90% of the
time) than workers who are not represented (about 60% of the time).
Workers represented by law students appear at hearings more often
(94%) than workers represented by attorneys (88%). Clinic students

73. In our data, clinical law students represent far fewer clients than attorneys. See
supra Chart 2. We note percentages and n sizes for clarity. When addressing case outcomes,
we also note statistical significance of the comparisons.
74. See Carpenter, Mark & Shanahan, Trial and Error, supra note 37, at 3; Shanahan,
Carpenter & Mark, supra note 9, at 474.
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also appear at their clients’ hearings more often (94%) than attorneys
(87%). These differences are all statistically significant.
Chart 5: Worker and Representative Appearance
n=4181 unrepresented, 818 attorney, 132 clinic
Unrepresented

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Attorney-represented

87%

94%

88%

94%

57%

Representative Appearance

3.

Clinic Student-represented

Party Appearance

Introduction of Evidence

The introduction of evidence, specifically testimony and
documents, during the hearing is an important strategic choice.75 In
theory, an ALJ may not accept into evidence documents that are
introduced at the hearing unless the documents meet a finding of
admissibility. In practice, hearsay is admissible in the hearings,
witnesses are rarely excluded, and other evidence is almost always
admitted. Our data bear this out: there is an overwhelming overlap
between the introduction and admission of documents.76 As a result,

75. We use all cases in the sample for our analysis of parties’ introduction of
evidence. We do not control for party appearance in this analysis because we view the choice
not to use an available procedure as a meaningful choice that a party and/or representative
makes regardless of whether the party appears at the hearing. A party might consider her
case, choose not to present testimony, and thus make the logical choice not to attend the
hearing. Or a party might choose to appear but not to present testimony. Either way, the
party is making an affirmative decision about how to proceed in the case given available
options in the litigation. If we excluded cases where a party does not appear from an analysis
of introduction of evidence, we would be making potentially unreasonable assumptions about
the failure to appear.
76. See Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, supra note 9, at 500 n.94.
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we do not present separate data here about whether evidence is
actually admitted.
Chart 6 captures the data regarding introduction of evidence.
Represented workers introduce testimony and documents at a rate that
is higher (54%-55%) than unrepresented workers (38%). Workers
represented by clinical law students and attorneys present testimony at
the same rate (54%-55%), while clinical law students introduce
documents significantly more often (26%) than attorneys (18%).
Chart 6: Worker Introduction of Evidence
n=4181 unrepresented, 818 attorney, 132 clinic
Unrepresented Worker

Attorney-represented

Clinic Student-represented

100%
80%
54%

60%
40%

55%

38%

20%

11%

18%

26%

0%
Testimony Introduced

4.

Documents Introduced

Discussion

What can we conclude from these findings about procedural
behaviors? A key component of an attorney’s professional expertise is
procedural expertise.77 If attorneys who practice in the OAH are the
professional “standard of care,” our data suggest that clinical law
students are practicing at this standard. Law school clinics in this
setting are teaching students to practice, at least with respect to using
available procedures.
Our interviews with unemployment judges help us to interpret
these findings about clinic student representation. The judges’
opinions about student representation are consistent with the idea that
students offer a similar standard of care as attorneys. A number of
judges spoke about representation quality and expressed support for
law student practice as a general matter. The judges noted that quality
among students, like that of lawyers, varies from person to person,
77.

Sandefur, supra note 9, at 915; Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, supra note 9.
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with some advocates operating at a higher level than others do. Judge
8 put it this way:
Some [law students] are very good, some are not. Some are
overzealous; they get kind of emotional with their arguments, and that
can be a problem. You need distance in order to be effective. Some are
well-organized and present good arguments. I guess it depends on how
well they are trained by the clinic.78

As discussed above, this finding is important because legal
educators have assumed, largely without measurement, that they are
teaching law students to act like lawyers.79 Proponents of law school
clinics have asserted that the clinical experience is a crucial site of
professional training. The finding that law students use procedures
like practicing lawyers suggests that clinical law students are learning
to be lawyers.
The significance of this finding might be muted since law school
clinics invariably combine the expertise of a student with the expertise
of her supervisor.80 Perhaps we are not measuring student learning
but instead measuring supervisor expertise. While we acknowledge
the conceptual and methodological challenges of teasing out these
distinctions, they may be overstated. Lawyers invariably work in
collaboration with others. We cannot separate a lawyer’s expertise in
cross-examination from the hours a paralegal spent reviewing
documents to find the perfect exhibit for impeachment, nor can we
separate the relative contributions of an associate who drafted a
closing statement from a partner who edited and delivered it.
This means that, at a minimum, our data tell us that clinical law
students, working as junior collaborators, are acting like practicing
lawyers, who themselves may or may not be working in collaboration
with other legal professionals. In theory, law school clinics are
dedicated to giving students maximum responsibility and autonomy
consistent with their professional obligations to clients.81 In fact,
clinical law students may have more autonomy in their clinic cases
than they will in practice as new attorneys.
78. Telephone Interview with Judge 8, Admin. Law Judge, D.C. Office of Admin.
Hearings (2015) (identity of interviewee and specific date of interview omitted per
Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocol).
79. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
80. Other professions have struggled with separating the role of collaborating service
providers. See, e.g., Joseph A. Durlak, Comparative Effectiveness of Paraprofessional and
Professional Helpers, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 80, 86-90 (1979) (noting the difficulty of
separating the influence of supervising mental health service providers and suggesting more
research as the solution).
81. See Schrag, supra note 14, at 205.
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In addition, a closer look at the data suggests that clinical law
students are using procedural tactics incrementally more often than
attorneys. The law students and their clients appear at their hearings
more often than attorneys and their clients. Students disclose prehearing evidence more often than attorneys. And students introduce
documents at the hearing more often than attorneys. These higher
levels of engagement might be understood in a few ways.
First, clinical law students might have a singular focus on their
clients that practicing attorneys do not (or cannot).82 Clinical law
students typically have many fewer clients than legal services
attorneys. Often, a clinic client is the first client for whom a student is
the lead representative. The student may be able to focus more on the
case—resulting in more time on investigation, more effort collecting
witnesses and documents, more thorough preparation—than a
seasoned practitioner with a sizeable case load.
Second, clinical law students might bring extra resources to the
case. As our interviews confirmed, a clinic student may work with a
student partner, a supervising attorney, and a larger group of student
colleagues. More advocates might uncover additional witnesses or
documents and develop additional case theories or arguments, which
translate into more active procedural engagement of the kind we
measure.
These explanations are consistent with judges’ perceptions of
law student practice. Judges consistently reported that law student
practice involves more procedural moves and longer hearings than
that of lawyers. Most judges noted, and in some cases were critical
of, the ways in which student practice is less “streamlined.” One
judge said that students like to do things “by the book” and that
hearings thus take more time. The judges pointed to procedures that
are not captured by our quantitative data, including opening and
closing statements, objections, and the length and complexity of
testimony.
Overall, the judges expressed a mix of frustration that law
student’s hearings may take more time and appreciation for the quality
of student representation. For example, Judge 2 said:
Law students play an important role. They want to over-litigate
sometimes, but that comes with the territory. I don’t know how many
times [the students] have been in evidentiary hearings so they’re under

82. See Juergens, supra note 2, at 347-49; Shalleck, supra note 19, at 759-63;
Shanahan, supra note 14.
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pressure to perform well. But it is my understanding that they know the
burdens [and] their clients; they tend to be well prepared.83

Judge 7 offered a similar view:
When law students represented claimants, they were interested in a
soup to nuts case. Not every case involves a constitutional issue. We
can accept hearsay, you don’t need to object to that. But the law
students paid a lot of attention to the claimants. [Some attorneys] did
not, perhaps because of their workload. [Some attorneys] did not spend
as much time as the law students did with the clients.84

Though the judges lamented that cases involving students take
more of the court’s time, they also applauded that law students
appeared to spend more time and energy on their cases compared to
attorneys. And their observations are consistent with the quantitative
findings that students engage in more procedural moves than lawyers.
In fact, the judicial perspective suggests that it is students’ greater
level of investment in their cases that leads to the use of more
procedures, and in turn, to longer hearings.85
Our data suggest that clinical law students are learning how to be
lawyers because they are exercising procedural expertise that
approximates that of experienced attorneys. But do clinical law
students help clients? We explore our findings on this question in the
next subpart.
C.

Are Law School Clinics Serving Clients?

As we have just described, clinical law students use key
procedures as often or more often than lawyers. But does this serve
their clients? We investigate this by asking two questions of our data.
First, how do case outcomes compare for unrepresented workers,
workers represented by law students, and workers represented by
attorneys? Second, when these differently represented parties use
procedural behaviors as described above, how do the case outcomes
compare?

83. Telephone Interview with Judge 2, Admin. Law Judge, D.C. Office of Admin.
Hearings (2015) (identity of interviewee and specific date of interview omitted per IRB
protocol).
84. Telephone Interview with Judge 7, Admin. Law Judge, D.C. Office of Admin.
Hearings (2015) (identity of interviewee and specific date of interview omitted per IRB
protocol).
85. This phenomenon may be related to the finding in another study—though our
data do not suggest it—that an offer of student of representation delays the receipt of UI
benefits. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 31, at 2153-58.
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We recognize that case outcomes are only one way of measuring
whether a representative serves a client. Case outcomes do not
account for less tangible but equally significant contributions to the
client’s experience of the civil justice system.86 Nonetheless, such
outcomes are important measures of representation, especially in the
context of unemployment insurance hearings where the benefits of
winning are immediate and tangible. We also recognize that this is an
observational study, and our analysis speaks only to correlation. That
said, these observations provide new insight into questions of law
clinic service that has not existed.
As described in this subpart, we find that similar use of
procedural tactics by clinical law students and attorneys yield similar
case outcomes, though we find some variation that suggests expertise
may operate differently for clinic students and attorneys. We also find
that workers represented by clinical law students have similar case
outcomes to those represented by attorneys.
1.

Case Outcomes and Procedural Behaviors

We begin by examining how procedural moves by clinical law
students and attorneys relate to case outcomes. In our analysis of case
outcomes, we include outcomes for unrepresented parties for
reference and context. While we include the data for unrepresented
workers, we recognize that we cannot account for the impact of
selection bias between parties with and without representation. Thus,
our main inquiry is into the relative behavior and performance of
clinical law students compared to attorneys.
Interestingly, we find that the use of a procedure does not
correlate consistently with higher worker win rates. As discussed
below, the implications of these findings are complex. Expert worker
representatives, including clinical students, may assist clients by
choosing not to use a procedure.
a.

Pre-Hearing Disclosure of Evidence

As Chart 4 above describes, attorneys and clinical law students
who represent workers disclose pre-hearing evidence at roughly
similar rates (35% and 45% of the time, respectively).

86.

See supra note 36.
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As depicted in Chart 7, workers generally do not win more often
when they disclose pre-hearing evidence. Unrepresented workers
prevail roughly as often when they disclose pre-hearing evidence
(55%) as when they do not (57%). The same is true for workers
represented by clinical law students and attorneys—they do not
prevail any more often when they disclose evidence (76% for
students, 78% for attorneys) than when they do not (78% for students,
80% for attorneys).
Chart 7: Worker Win Rates By Disclosure of Evidence
Disclose Evidence
100%
80%
60%

55% 57%
n=3346 n=810

Don't Disclose Evidence
78% 80%
76% 78%
n=283 n=530
n=58 n=73

40%
20%
0%
Unrepresented
z=-.74 *Not SS

b.

Attorney-represented
z=-.575 *Not SS

Clinic Studentrepresented
z=.3 *Not SS

Party Appearance at Hearing

Chart 5 above describes how workers represented by clinical law
students and attorneys appear at similar rates at hearings
(approximately 90% of the time).
As Chart 8 depicts, workers who appear at their hearings win
significantly more often than workers who do not, regardless of
representation. Unrepresented workers win much more often when
they appear (71%) than when they do not (40%). The same is true for
workers represented by attorneys (82% versus 63%) and clinical law
students (78% versus 63%). These differences are all statistically
significant.
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Chart 8: Worker Win Rates By Party Appearance
Party Appears No Party Appears
100%
80%
60%
40%

82%
n=706

71%
n=2302

63%
n=101

78%
n=123

63%
n=8

40%
n=761

20%
0%
Unrepresented
z=-21.65

c.

Attorney-represented
z=-4.31

Clinic Studentrepresented
z=-1.01

Introduction of Testimony and Documents

Chart 6 above illustrates how clinical law students introduce
testimony and documents in hearings at slightly higher rates than
attorneys.
As Chart 9 depicts, workers generally do not fare any better
when they introduce documents. And this null finding is true
regardless of whether the worker is represented or by whom.
Chart 9: Worker Win Rates By Introduction of Documents
Introduce Documents
Don't Introduce Documents
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

57% 55%
n=3679 n=477

Unrepresented
z=-.847 *Not SS

77% 80%
n=665 n=148

Attorney-represented
z=.72 *Not SS

74%
n=34

78%
n=97

Clinic Studentrepresented
z=.575 *Not SS

As depicted in Chart 10, unrepresented workers win slightly
more when they testify (59%) as when they do not (53%). However,
represented workers win more often when they do not present
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testimony.87 This finding is statistically significant for both workers
represented by attorneys and workers represented by clinical law
students.
Chart 10: Worker Win Rates By Introduction of Testimony
Introduce Testimony
Don't Introduce Testimony

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

59% 53%
n=1616 n=2603

Unrepresented
z=-3.38

d.

76% 83%
n=442 n=371

Attorney-represented
z=2.27

71%
n=72

85%
n=59

Clinic Studentrepresented
z=1.88

Combined Procedures

Finally, we aggregate these procedures to compare overall
procedural behavior and case outcomes of workers represented by
attorneys to those represented by clinical law students.
Chart 11 depicts case outcomes when workers took any one of
the procedural steps described above (pre-hearing evidence
disclosure, hearing appearances, or introduction of testimony and
documents). When unrepresented workers took a procedural step,
they have slightly higher but statistically greater win rates (57%) than
when they took no steps (54%). However, workers represented by
attorneys win less often when they deploy a procedural step (77%)
than when they do not (84%); workers represented by clinical law
students likewise win less often when they take a procedural step
(71%) than when they do not (92%).88
Further, workers represented by clinical law students appear to
prevail more often (92%) than workers represented by attorneys
(84%) when they do not deploy a procedural tactic, especially the
87. This finding (independent of representative type) is also discussed in Shanahan,
Carpenter & Mark, supra note 9, at 508.
88. This analysis of combined procedures raises the question whether appearance is a
distinct procedural step or one that subsumes introducing evidence. Each step is distinct in
the data, accounting for different case outcomes in comparison to each other. Each step is
also theoretically different and an important consideration in understanding strategic
expertise. To disclose evidence is a different strategic choice than to appear at a hearing, and
to appear at a hearing is a different strategic choice than to introduce testimony.
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introduction of testimony; at the same time, workers represented by
clinical law students prevail less often (71%) than workers represented
by attorneys (77%) when they deploy such a tactic.
Chart 11: Worker Win Rates In Combined Procedural Model
Use a Procedural Step
Don't Use a Procedural Step
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80%
60%

57% 54%
n=2071 n=2148

77%
n=564

84%
n=249
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n=92

40%
20%
0%
Unrepresented
z=-2.28

Attorney-represented
z=2.39

Clinic Studentrepresented
z=2.69

What are the potential explanations for the observation that
workers represented by clinical law students win more often than
workers represented by attorneys when they do not use a procedural
step, and win less often when they do use a procedural step? One
explanation is that students win less than attorneys when they use a
procedural step because of a gap in expertise that translates to less
successful uses of procedure. This explanation is consistent with the
results discussed below showing that worker attorneys are more
successful than clinical law students against represented employers.
Another explanation is that clinical law students may use
procedure for procedure’s sake. Put another way, students’ procedural
expertise (or desire to exercise it) may exceed their strategic expertise.
This explanation is borne out by our interviews with clinic directors—
some of whom discussed using procedural steps, especially gathering,
disclosing, and introducing documents, more aggressively as a matter
of clinic practice.89 It is also consistent with the perspective of judges
in our interviews.90
A third explanation is that clinical law students win more when
they do not use a step because they have the time and resources to
89.
90.

See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
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take and invest in harder cases.91 This means they have done more
investigation or more analysis of the facts of their client’s case to
make the strategic choice not to disclose or introduce evidence. As a
result, this choice yields better case outcomes. For example, with
limited factual investigation, it may seem like a worker is a credible
witness with reasonable explanations for the incident for which she
was fired, and thus having her testify is a wise strategic use of
procedures. Yet additional investigation and preparation would
uncover several older disciplinary incidents that would be revealed on
cross examination, making the worker testimony a risky procedural
move. This theory is consistent with our interviews, where clinic
directors reported extensive preparation processes.92 On the other
hand, attorneys handling these cases reported that they sometimes
took clients shortly before hearings, a practice that limited factual
preparation.
A fourth explanation is based in our interviews with clinic
directors, who suggested that clinics do not screen for cases based on
merit and often prefer to take “harder” cases. These cases may
involve challenging facts, challenging clients, or expansion of the law,
all of which are seen as valuable educational opportunities for law
students.93 In addition, with very rare exceptions, clinical law students
always attend the hearings.94 Our interviews confirmed our instinct
that clinical law students are unlikely to counsel a client to drop a
case. This may in part be due to student enthusiasm and desire to
conduct a hearing, but is also grounded in the law, which places the
burden on employers in these cases.
In contrast, our interviews with attorneys representing workers
revealed a somewhat different approach. The attorneys who represent
the large majority of workers in these cases discussed how they do not
cherry pick or select cases that are sure to win, but rather select cases
with sympathetic clients as well as cases that have the potential to
expand areas of the law that are a priority.95 In addition, attorneys
91. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
92. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
93. Another way to characterize this difference is that clinical law students are less
likely to have “meritorious” cases. We resist this characterization—and the theories that flow
from it—because we do not believe “merit” is a useful metric in this analysis. Workers do
not have the burden of proof in these cases, and in practice this means that no worker has an
objectively “meritless” case. This also means that all cases have a commonality, based in the
law and its allocation of presumptions and burdens, regardless of the factual circumstances of
the case.
94. Only 6% of clinical law student representatives (eight representatives over almost
three years) did not attend a hearing. See supra Chart 5.
95. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
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reported—and the data bear out—that they do not always see cases
through to a hearing, sometimes counseling a client to drop a case or
sometimes taking a client without the promise of hearing
representation and instead providing advice or assistance before the
hearing. This combination of factors may result in clinic students
appearing at hearings where they are less likely to win than hearings
at which attorneys for workers appear. This simple explanation—law
students’ use of procedure is less successful because they have
tougher cases—may explain our finding regarding use of procedures
and win rates.
2.

Case Outcomes in General

Finally, we examine overall patterns of case outcomes among
workers with different types of representation. We find that clinical
law students and attorneys have overall similar case outcomes, though
when the employer is represented, workers represented by an attorney
win more often than workers represented by clinical law students.
a.

Worker Win Rates

As depicted in Chart 12, workers win their cases more often
when they are represented (78%) than when they are not (56%), and
the difference is statistically significant. Workers represented by
either clinic students or attorneys win their cases at statistically
indistinguishable rates (77% and 79%, respectively).
Chart 12: Worker Win Rates
Unrepresented
Attorney-represented
100%
80%
60%

78%
n=965

Represented
Clinic Student-represented
*Not SS
79% 77%
n=813 n=131
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Representative Type
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Balance of Power and Worker Win Rates

As described in our earlier work, introducing the balance of
representation gives a more nuanced picture than a party’s case
outcome on its own.96 Chart 13 illustrates worker win rates with
employer representation included.
In cases where the employer is unrepresented, workers win their
cases more often when they are represented, with significantly higher
win rates when the worker is represented by clinical law students
(84%) than when they are represented by attorneys (80%). In cases
where the employer is represented—by either a lawyer or a lay
advocate—workers win their cases more often when represented.
However, workers win cases against represented employers less
often when they are represented by clinical law students (65% against
attorneys, 68% against lay advocates) than when they are represented
by attorneys (77% against attorneys, 79% against lay advocates). In
fact, when a lay advocate represents the employer, unrepresented
workers win almost as often (66%) as workers represented by clinical
law students (68%).
Chart 13: Balance of Power and Worker Win Rates
Unrepresented worker
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Discussion

A number of possible explanations could account for this
variation between clinic students and attorneys as representatives.
First, both clinical law students and attorneys are quite successful
96.

Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, supra note 9, at 487-88.
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when facing unrepresented employers. This is not particularly
surprising, as we have discussed elsewhere.97 Clinic students’ slightly
greater success than attorneys against unrepresented parties may be
explained by the relative advantage of being a representative with
expertise who is nonetheless perceived as non-threatening or
inexperienced. That is, a clinic student may be less likely to be seen
as having an unfair advantage against an unrepresented employer but
still have similar procedural expertise to an attorney.
Second, clinical law student performance against represented
employers may reveal that clinical law students’ expertise
approximates but is not quite at the same level as that of attorneys.
Thus, clinic students are successful representatives for workers
generally, but less so when challenged by a representative for the
employer. This may be particularly salient in our data set, where
many of the lay representatives and attorneys for employers are both
repeat players and better-resourced corporate parties.98
In contrast, though law clinics as institutions may appear
consistently in the court, an individual student is not a repeat player.
And though law clinics and legal services organizations have more
resources than a pro se litigant, they do not marshal the resources of
either a large corporate employer or the large companies that provide
lay representation in our data.99 Thus, a lay or attorney representative
for employers who regularly appears in this court can outmatch a
clinical law student with no relationship to the judge and limited case
experience. The relative case outcomes between attorneys and clinic
students on the worker side may be even more exaggerated because
the attorneys on the worker side are also largely repeat players, thus
they can offset the repeat player advantage of the employer’s
representative.
V.

CONCLUSION

This study moves us toward answering important questions
about law school clinics: Do law clinics teach students to practice, and
do clinical law students serve their clients well? These questions
address two core challenges of our legal system: the challenge faced
97. See id. at 487.
98. See Carpenter, Mark & Shanahan, Trial and Error, supra note 37, at 10 n.16; see
also Donald R. Songer, Reginald S. Sheehan & Susan Brodie Haire, Do the “Haves” Come
Out Ahead over Time? Applying Galanter’s Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 1925-1988, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 811, 827 (1999) (finding advantages for repeat
players and for “haves” or litigants with substantial organizational resources).
99. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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by law schools to prepare students for legal practice, and the challenge
faced by our civil and criminal justice system to ensure access for
low- and middle-income individuals. It is not surprising that law
school clinics have been suggested as a solution to each challenge.
Our findings suggest that clinics are both teaching students to behave
like lawyers and serving clients as lawyers do.
Our findings support arguments that law school clinics are
preparing students to become lawyers because they show clinical law
students exercising procedural expertise in the same way as
experienced lawyers. Our findings support arguments that law clinics
can increase access to our civil courts because they show that clinical
law students’ use of procedures yields similar case outcomes to the
same behavior by experienced attorneys. Though our findings
regarding the relationship between procedural behavior and case
outcomes suggests that clinical law students may be exercising
strategic expertise in perhaps less-developed ways than experienced
attorneys, workers represented by clinical law students overall have
similar case outcomes to those represented by experienced attorneys.
Our findings also suggest that clinical law students may be overengaging in their clients’ cases in a way that advances learning, but
may initially appear not to serve the client well. An equally plausible
explanation is that law clinics are taking harder cases. This, too, is
part of the service mission of law school clinics. It may be that law
school clinics achieve the most impact when they intentionally take
clients less likely to win or in contexts where the law is not operating
well, so that the very presence of clinic representation achieves
broader change.100
At least two lessons emerge from this study. First, we should
continue to develop law clinics as a way to prepare students for
practice. And this development must include measurement of this
preparation. There are more than 1000 law school clinics around the
country engaged in different educational approaches, yet few of us
actually measure how well we achieve our teaching outcomes.101 We
100. See, e.g., Beth Harris, Representing Homeless Families: Repeat Player
Implementation Strategies, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 911 (1999) (drawing on Marc Galanter’s
theories of public interest lawyers as agents of social change to describe the combination of
adversarial legal tactics with leveraging judicial decisions to implement reform for homeless
families in housing disputes); Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, A Little Representation, supra
note 37, at 1372-74.
101. Though the American Bar Association’s current efforts to mandate outcome
measurement by law schools is complex and controversial, we believe that law school clinics
hold the potential to design and define measurement of learning outcomes in a thoughtful
way that reflects and respects the strengths of clinical legal education.
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are encouraged by clinicians’ increasing openness to evaluation and
measurement, and we hope that our study motivates others to
undertake such inquiry.
Second, we should maximize law clinics as opportunities to
serve clients and close the justice gap.102 Our findings suggest that
clinics serve clients well. Increasing clinic resources, developing new
clinics, and connecting clinics with access to justice movements
would help to address the justice crisis. There are dozens of state
access to justice commissions trying to help low- and middle-income
Americans access our civil courts with limited resources. Law school
clinics are natural partners in such efforts, and measuring their impact
can only improve service delivery models and outcomes going forward.

102. This study includes only data about clinical law students from in-house clinics.
While we recognize that other forms of student representation exist in many places, we do not
have comparative data of that nature here. We hope that this Article spurs research into these
different types of student representation to explore their value as educational and access to
justice solutions.

